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Brandon Scott Barney
China prevented the export of tea leaves to keep Westerners addicted to caffeine and keep silver extracted from everywhere coming from Ming to Qing and this imbalance led to evil people after they tried to trade technology for the tea they were addicted to but the Chinese love their caffeine profits until the British took the lesson and exported opium and there were American old money families in on the trade but the money the Wu Bingjian trader a hong merchant in the Thirteen Factories was actually re-invested in American railroads and major projects so the trade with west produced Asia’s first billionaire who made money on silver arbitrage and invested his money into America which accelerated America’s rise

中國曾通過限制茶葉出口，以此維持西方人對(duì)咖啡因的依賴，同時(shí)確保從明朝到清朝期間，全球各地的白銀不斷流入中國。這種貿(mào)易不平衡引致了一些不正當(dāng)?shù)男袨?，他們?cè)噲D用他們所依賴的茶葉來交換技術(shù)，但中國人更偏愛從咖啡因貿(mào)易中獲得的利潤，直到英國人從中吸取教訓(xùn)，開始向中國出口鴉片。同時(shí)，一些美國的富有家族也參與了鴉片貿(mào)易。然而，伍秉鑒——廣州十三行的商人，實(shí)際上將通過銀子套利賺到的錢再投資到美國的鐵路和其他重大項(xiàng)目上。這樣，和西方的貿(mào)易間接催生了亞洲的第一位億萬富翁，他通過銀子套利積累財(cái)富，并將其投資于美國，進(jìn)而加速了美國的崛起。

Grain backed paper currency of the early Song similar to the Franc which collapsed after the Mississippi Company folded the Chinese paper currency went off the grain standard in the Mongol era which enabled the Treasure Ships which didn’t produce a sufficient return collapsing that dynasty

早期宋朝的糧食支撐的紙幣體系與法國的法郎類似，都在密西西比公司倒閉后崩潰。中國的紙幣在蒙古統(tǒng)治時(shí)期放棄了糧食本位，這使得寶船的航行未能帶來足夠的回報(bào)，最終導(dǎo)致了那個(gè)王朝的衰落。

Zheng He did end up having an unintended consequence whose impact would be global. At the time of the voyages, Chinese dynasties had been employing paper currency since the 11th century. During the time of Mongol rule the practice had been continued and the Ming Dynasty had initially followed suit as well. The earlier systems had backed paper currency with grain (meaning you could exchange, or “convert”, your paper for its value in grain), but during the Ming, money was not backed and was not convertible. The building and maintenance of the treasure fleet was a breaking point for the then unconvertible paper currency. To meet the costs of shipbuilding and supply the state printed far too much money leading it to tank in value.

鄭和的航行最終產(chǎn)生了一個(gè)意想不到的后果，其影響是全球性的。在航行期間，中國的王朝自11世紀(jì)以來就開始使用紙幣。在蒙古統(tǒng)治時(shí)期，這一做法得以延續(xù)，明朝最初也跟隨其后。早期的紙幣是以糧食作為支撐（這意味著你可以將紙幣兌換成等值的糧食），但在明朝時(shí)期，貨幣沒有支撐，也不可兌換。寶船艦隊(duì)的建造和維護(hù)成為了當(dāng)時(shí)不可兌換紙幣制度的臨界點(diǎn)。為了滿足造船和供應(yīng)的成本，國家印刷了過多的貨幣，導(dǎo)致其價(jià)值大幅下跌。

By the mid-15th century, just as the voyages were ending, increasing numbers of merchants were refusing to accept paper in return for their goods. In place of paper, a more informal system of barter emerged with sellers and buyers determining what constituted fair value. Localities tended to develop their own mediums of exchange so that in some places it could be bolts of silk, in others grain, and some areas even began minting their own copper or bronze coins. Without a clear long-term plan, the Ming began slowly and sporadically introducing a new system in which copper coins would be minted for everyday purchases while large purchases would be made with silver.

到了15世紀(jì)中葉，正值航?；顒?dòng)接近尾聲時(shí)，越來越多的商人開始拒絕接受紙幣作為商品交換的貨幣。取而代之的是，一個(gè)更加非正式的以物易物系統(tǒng)出現(xiàn)了，賣家和買家自行決定什么是公平的價(jià)值。各地開始發(fā)展自己的交換媒介，以至于在一些地方可能是絲綢，在其他地方可能是糧食，有些地區(qū)甚至開始鑄造自己的銅幣或青銅幣。明朝沒有明確的長期規(guī)劃，開始逐步而零星地引入一種新體系，即鑄造銅幣用于日常交易，而大額交易則使用白銀。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://m.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Along with this, emerged a new tax policy. Instead of taxing each local area in grain and labor, the Ming gradually began requesting tax payments in silver. This began as early as 1436 and then began more formalized over the next century and a half. By the second half of the 16th century, a new norm had emerged by which taxes were paid in silver which the state then used to pay for the costs of administering the empire.

與此同時(shí)，新的稅收政策也隨之出現(xiàn)。明朝不再以糧食和勞動(dòng)力的形式對(duì)地方進(jìn)行征稅，而是逐步轉(zhuǎn)向要求以白銀來支付稅款。這一變化始于1436年，之后的一百五十年里，這種稅收方式逐漸變得正式化。到了16世紀(jì)下半葉，以白銀繳稅成為了新的常態(tài)，國家隨后利用這些白銀來支付管理帝國的費(fèi)用。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://m.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

One of the reasons that the system took so long to implement is because the supply of silver was not great enough to keep up with the huge demand that would come from requiring all 120 million subjects of the Ming to pay taxes in silver. This challenge was gradually resolved by enormous increases in the global silver supply. Japan was a major supplier for the first half of the 16th century, but it was mined in Spanish America which would become the key source of silver for the Ming economy by the end of the century. The huge demand for silver in China meant that its value was also extremely high there.

這個(gè)制度之所以實(shí)施得如此緩慢，一個(gè)原因是白銀的供應(yīng)量不足以滿足明王朝要求其1.2億臣民全部用白銀納稅的巨大需求。這一難題隨著全球白銀供應(yīng)量的激增而逐步得到緩解。16世紀(jì)上半葉，日本是主要的白銀供應(yīng)國，但到了世紀(jì)末，西班牙在美洲的銀礦成為了明王朝經(jīng)濟(jì)中白銀的關(guān)鍵來源。中國對(duì)白銀的巨大需求也意味著白銀在中國的價(jià)值極高。

From the late 16th century the exchange rate of gold to silver was between 1:5.5 to 1:7 while at the same time in Spain, the rate was 1:12 to 1:14. Because silver was twice as valuable in China it created a huge incentive for anyone who had silver to do their best to get it to China. Through most of the 17th century, 150 tons of silver a year passed from the Americas through Europe and into Asia. Maybe even more significantly, 128 tons a year crossed the Pacific from Acapulco to the Spanish colony of Manila in the Philippines (Figure 2.6.1) where Chinese merchants waited to exchange their silks and porcelains for American silver.

從16世紀(jì)末起，黃金與白銀的兌換比率在中國是1:5.5到1:7，而同期在西班牙則是1:12到1:14。由于白銀在中國的價(jià)值是西班牙的兩倍，這為那些擁有白銀的人提供了極大的動(dòng)機(jī)，驅(qū)使他們盡可能地將白銀運(yùn)往中國。在17世紀(jì)的大部分時(shí)間里，每年有大約150噸白銀從美洲經(jīng)過歐洲流入亞洲?；蛟S更值得注意的是，每年有約128噸白銀橫渡太平洋，從阿卡普爾科運(yùn)抵西班牙在菲律賓的馬尼拉殖民地，那里的中國商人翹首以待，準(zhǔn)備用他們的絲綢和瓷器換取來自美洲的白銀。

The Chinese economy had become like a vacuum cleaner sucking up huge quantities of the global silver supply. According to Flynn and Giraldez, the founding of Manila in 1571 marked the beginning of a truly global trading system. For the first time, all the major populated continents were lixed through “substantial, direct, and continuous trade.” (Flynn and Giraldez, 201)

中國經(jīng)濟(jì)就像一個(gè)吸塵器一樣，吸納了全球大量的白銀供應(yīng)。根據(jù)弗林和吉拉爾德斯的觀點(diǎn)，1571年馬尼拉的建立標(biāo)志著一個(gè)真正全球性貿(mào)易體系的開端。這是第一次，所有主要的人口大陸通過“實(shí)質(zhì)性的、直接的、持續(xù)的貿(mào)易”聯(lián)系在了一起。（參考自弗林和吉拉爾德斯的著作，第201頁）

It is worth remembering that within this new global trade, the most important components were Chinese demand and American supply. The high price of silver in China drove the Spanish to exploit their Andean and Mexican mines for all they were worth, to develop complex systems to provide those mines with labor, and to establish a colony in the Philippines nearly 9,000 miles away from its port in Acapulco to access the Chinese market. The result was that the Ming Dynasty got its silver and Spain, which was otherwise a relatively small underdeveloped kingdom, became for a time the great European world power.

值得記住的是，在這次全新的全球貿(mào)易格局中，中國的需求和美洲的供給是最關(guān)鍵的因素。由于中國銀價(jià)高昂，西班牙人被驅(qū)使去全力開發(fā)他們?cè)诎驳谒股矫}和墨西哥的銀礦，構(gòu)建復(fù)雜的勞動(dòng)力系統(tǒng)來支持這些礦場(chǎng)，并在距離阿卡普爾科港口近9000英里的菲律賓建立殖民地，以便進(jìn)入中國市場(chǎng)。結(jié)果是，明朝獲得了所需的白銀，而西班牙這個(gè)原本規(guī)模較小、發(fā)展程度不高的國家，一度成為了歐洲的強(qiáng)大帝國。

The flip side of this is that when the price of silver in China began to reach an equilibrium with the rest of the world, Spanish mining profits dried up, its ability to support its ambitions fell, and its status as a world power declined nearly as fast as it had risen. For its part, the Ming Dynasty also suffered as a result of fluctuations in silver prices. With silver losing about ? of its value by the 1630’s it was as if Ming revenue had shrunk by a similar amount. This created a fiscal crisis that was ultimately one of the contributing causes of the fall of the Ming and the emergence of the Qing Dynasty after 1644. In this globalizing world, it was increasingly possible for conditions on one side of the world to dramatically impact people’s lives on the other.

這一現(xiàn)象的另一面是，當(dāng)中國的銀價(jià)開始與世界其他地區(qū)趨于平衡時(shí)，西班牙的采礦利潤隨之枯竭，其支持?jǐn)U張的能力也隨之下降，其作為世界強(qiáng)國的地位幾乎以它崛起的速度一樣迅速衰落。對(duì)于明朝來說，銀價(jià)的波動(dòng)也帶來了災(zāi)難性的后果。到了1630年代，銀的價(jià)值縮水了大約三分之二，這使得明朝的財(cái)政收入仿佛也減少了同等的數(shù)額。這種情況引發(fā)了一場(chǎng)財(cái)政危機(jī)，最終成為導(dǎo)致明朝滅亡和1644年清朝興起的原因之一。在這個(gè)日益全球化的世界中，世界一端的狀況越來越有可能對(duì)另一端人們的生活產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)的影響。

The Qing dynasty suffered the famous humiliation in the 19th but blaming it on the west misunderstands current scholarship which is far more erudite and nuanced:

清朝在19世紀(jì)遭遇了眾所周知的屈辱，但如果將責(zé)任完全推給西方，就忽視了學(xué)術(shù)界更為深入和細(xì)致的研究：

“…Economic depression in early nineteenth-century China was marked by a sustained decline in silver prices beginning in c. 1815. The Daoguang Depression coincided with an ecological crisis: climatic disturbances, harvest failures and catastrophic floods, particularly during the period 1815–1835. Conventional explanations for China’s economic troubles have emphasized either: (1) China’s incorporation into a capitalist world economy on unfavourable terms, resulting in a massive drain of silver abroad, primarily to pay for opium imports; or (2) a Malthusian crisis of subsistence triggered by unsustainable population increases that overtaxed the productive capacity of the Chinese economy . Yet neither of these theses is satisfactory.

“……19世紀(jì)初，中國經(jīng)歷了一場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條，其標(biāo)志是自1815年左右開始的銀價(jià)持續(xù)下跌。道光時(shí)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條與一系列生態(tài)危機(jī)相伴而生：氣候異常、農(nóng)作物歉收和嚴(yán)重的洪水災(zāi)害，特別是在1815至1835年間。對(duì)于中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)困境，常見的解釋包括：（1）中國在不利條件下被納入資本主義世界體系，導(dǎo)致大量白銀流向國外，主要是為了支付鴉片進(jìn)口的費(fèi)用；（2）由于人口增長過快，超出了中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的生產(chǎn)能力，引發(fā)了一場(chǎng)馬爾薩斯式的生存危機(jī)。然而，這兩種觀點(diǎn)都不能令人完全滿意。

In the first place, the onset of economic depression pre-dated the reversal in the flow of silver bullion. As Li Bozhong has observed, complaints of economic distress and widespread impoverishment of rich and poor alike were already being aired by 1820, well before the outflow of silver and bronze coin depreciation had become severe (Li 2007: 173–178). Moreover, any assessment of the impact of silver flows on the Chinese economy must consider questions of demand as well as supply. As Kishimoto Mio has shown, the penetration of foreign silver as shown by the adoption of the Carolus peso as a monetary standard varied extensively by region, and even by type of transaction (Kishimoto 2011: 13–17).

首先，經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條的開始早于白銀流動(dòng)方向的轉(zhuǎn)變。正如李伯重所指出的，到1820年，人們已經(jīng)開始抱怨經(jīng)濟(jì)不景氣，富人和窮人普遍陷入貧困，早在銀幣和銅幣外流之前，貶值就變得嚴(yán)重了（李伯重，2007年：173-178頁）。此外，對(duì)白銀流動(dòng)對(duì)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)影響的任何評(píng)估，都必須考慮需求和供應(yīng)問題。正如岸本美緒所揭示的，外國銀幣，特別是卡洛斯銀元作為貨幣標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的普及程度，在不同地區(qū)之間存在顯著差異，甚至在不同類型的交易中也有所不同（岸本美緒，2011年：13-17頁）。

For example, in Jiangnan, the Carolus peso was widely used as the common currency of trade and finance by the beginning of the nineteenth century, yet land sale contracts continued to be denominated in bronze coin well into the nineteenth century. The complexity of China’s domestic monetary system at this time—which included Carolus pesos, copper and silver notes, and bronze coin as well as bullion silver—is still not sufficiently well understood. Given the present state of knowledge, we should beware any theories that treat the Chinese monetary system—or, for that matter, the Chinese economy —as an undifferentiated whole.

例如，到了19世紀(jì)初，江南地區(qū)已經(jīng)普遍使用卡洛斯銀幣（西班牙銀元或“雙柱”銀元）作為貿(mào)易和金融的通用貨幣，但土地銷售合同直到19世紀(jì)仍然以銅錢為單位。當(dāng)時(shí)中國國內(nèi)貨幣體系的復(fù)雜性——包括卡洛斯銀幣、銅錢、銀票以及銅幣和銀錠——至今尚未被充分理解。鑒于目前的認(rèn)知水平，我們應(yīng)避免接受任何將中國貨幣體系——或者更廣泛地說，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)——視為一個(gè)單一、未分化整體的理論。

The new evidence for a Malthusian crisis from recent research—falling per capita GDP and real wages—is encumbered by methodological problems and questionable theoretical assumptions. The reversal of price trends in c. 1815—resulting in steep deflation in silver prices, but a steady level in relative prices—and the continuous population expansion down to the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion belie a Malthusian narrative. Of course, given the massive scale of the Chinese Empire, regional variations were undoubtedly significant. The decline of cotton cloth manufacture in Jiangnan during the second quarter of the nineteenth century was related to structural and long-term conjunctural shifts in China’s domestic economy.

最近的研究為馬爾薩斯危機(jī)提供了新的證據(jù)——人均國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值和實(shí)際工資的下降——因方法論問題和有問題的理論假設(shè)而受到質(zhì)疑。大約在1815年，價(jià)格趨勢(shì)發(fā)生了逆轉(zhuǎn)，這導(dǎo)致銀價(jià)出現(xiàn)了劇烈的通貨緊縮，但相對(duì)價(jià)格保持穩(wěn)定，而且人口持續(xù)增長直至太平天國起義爆發(fā)，這些都與馬爾薩斯理論的敘述不符。當(dāng)然，考慮到中國帝國的龐大規(guī)模，地區(qū)差異無疑是非常重要的。19世紀(jì)中葉江南地區(qū)棉布制造業(yè)的衰退與中國經(jīng)濟(jì)內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)性和長期周期性的轉(zhuǎn)變有關(guān)。

The concentration of population growth in poorer regions in western China and the increasing rustification of handicraft production had adverse effects on urban manufacture in regions such as Jiangnan, which could no longer compete with cheaper cotton goods produced in the interior regions.

中國西部較貧困地區(qū)的人口增長集中，以及手工業(yè)生產(chǎn)的日益衰退，對(duì)江南等地區(qū)的城市制造業(yè)產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面影響，這些地區(qū)生產(chǎn)的棉產(chǎn)品無法與內(nèi)地更廉價(jià)的棉產(chǎn)品相競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

The economic depression in early nineteenth-century China should be seen in the context of a long-standing pattern of conjunctural oscillation of economic expansion and contraction typical of advanced pre-modern economies. In the classic formulation of Fran?ois Simiand, a long wave of economic expansion—the A-phase of population growth, expanding output and rising prices—was inevitably followed by an equally long B-phase of high mortality, deflation and stagnant output . Jack Goldstone has argued that the A-phase of commercial growth and economic prosperity that germinated across Eurasia in the early sixteenth century ultimately culminated in the economic distress, social conflicts and political crises that erupted in Ming China,

19世紀(jì)初中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長放緩應(yīng)當(dāng)被理解為一種長期存在的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張與收縮周期性波動(dòng)的延續(xù)，這種波動(dòng)是典型的先進(jìn)前現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)體的特征。根據(jù)弗朗索瓦·西米安的經(jīng)典理論，經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張的長波——即A階段，表現(xiàn)為人口增長、產(chǎn)出增加和價(jià)格上漲——不可避免地會(huì)接著一個(gè)同樣漫長的B階段，這一階段以高死亡率、通貨緊縮和產(chǎn)出停滯為特征。杰克·戈德斯通提出，16世紀(jì)初在歐亞大陸萌芽的商業(yè)增長和經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮的A階段，最終導(dǎo)致了明朝中國出現(xiàn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)困境、社會(huì)沖突和政治危機(jī)。

Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the mid-seventeenth century. The subsequent B-phase of economic contraction lasted until the early eighteenth century before the Chinese and European economies regained momentum, inaugurating a new A-phase .

在17世紀(jì)中葉，西歐和奧斯曼帝國經(jīng)歷了經(jīng)濟(jì)收縮的B階段，這一階段一直持續(xù)到18世紀(jì)初。之后，中國和歐洲的經(jīng)濟(jì)才開始恢復(fù)增長，開啟了新的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張的A階段。

In my view, although we can find some parallels in the cyclical trends of growth and decline in China and Europe in the period 1500–1800, there were crucial differences as well. 25 In the case of China, the long A-phase that lasted from the 1690s down to the 1790s did not end in a demographic collapse, but rather a precarious equilibrium .

在我看來，盡管在1500至1800年間中國和歐洲的增長與衰退周期趨勢(shì)中存在某些相似之處，但也存在一些關(guān)鍵的不同點(diǎn)。在中國的例子中，從1690年代延續(xù)至1790年代的長期A階段并沒有導(dǎo)致人口崩潰，而是形成了一種微妙的平衡。

It is quite possible that eighteenth-century China experienced an ‘industrious revolution’ not unlike that hypothesized for contemporary Japan and Europe, in which population expansion was accompanied by the intensification of work and increased non-agricultural production in the countryside that, together with the development of horizontal exchange within local and regional markets, led to economic specialization and productivity gains equalling or exceeding demographic growth. 26 Despite the apparent synchronicity of the Daoguang Depression and the B-phase of deflation and economic contraction in Europe during the period 1817–1850, fundamental differences between the economies of China and Europe had emerged by this time. 27

非常有可能的是，18世紀(jì)的中國經(jīng)歷了一場(chǎng)“勤勞革命”，與當(dāng)時(shí)日本和歐洲的情況頗為相似。在這場(chǎng)革命中，人口的增長伴隨著勞動(dòng)強(qiáng)度的提高和農(nóng)村非農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)出的增加，這些變化與本地及區(qū)域市場(chǎng)內(nèi)部的水平交換發(fā)展相結(jié)合，促進(jìn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)的專業(yè)化和生產(chǎn)率的提升，使得經(jīng)濟(jì)增長與人口增長持平甚至超越了人口增長。盡管道光蕭條與1817至1850年間歐洲的通貨緊縮和經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的B階段在時(shí)間上似乎同步，但到那時(shí)，中國與歐洲的經(jīng)濟(jì)之間已經(jīng)顯現(xiàn)出根本的差異。

In addition, the role of silver imports in the Chinese economy had changed since the ‘Silver Century’ of 1550–1650. The primacy of silver—a cardinal feature of the A-phase of 1500–1650—became attenuated as bronze coin displaced silver bullion as the monetary standard in many local markets in the eighteenth century. Moreover, the economics of the silver trade had changed dramatically, as the arbitrage profits that orchestrated the global movements of silver during the ‘Silver Century’ vanished. Just as the causes of the Daoguang Depression are to be found in China’s domestic economic conditions rather than the global economy, the reduced demand for money (silver and bronze coin alike) during these decades was a symptom, not the cause, of this economic distress.”

此外，自1550至1650年的“白銀世紀(jì)”以來，白銀進(jìn)口在中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長中的作用已經(jīng)發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變。白銀的主導(dǎo)地位——作為1500至1650年A階段的一個(gè)核心特征——隨著銅錢在18世紀(jì)的許多地方市場(chǎng)取代白銀成為貨幣標(biāo)準(zhǔn)而逐漸減弱。同時(shí)，白銀交易的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式也發(fā)生了劇烈變化，因?yàn)樵凇鞍足y世紀(jì)”期間推動(dòng)全球白銀流動(dòng)的套利利潤已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在。正如道光蕭條的根源在于中國國內(nèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況而非全球經(jīng)濟(jì)，這些年代里對(duì)貨幣（包括白銀和銅錢）需求的減少實(shí)際上是這種經(jīng)濟(jì)困境的一個(gè)表現(xiàn)，而非其成因。

原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://m.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

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