SE專業(yè)問答：北約在冒著與俄羅斯爆發(fā)熱戰(zhàn)風(fēng)險的情況下，將東歐包括烏克蘭納入其擴張范圍，真正的動機到底是什么？

Allure
I don't think this is a valid question here, since it's asking for motivations that none of us are privy to. Not to mention it's an awfully tendentious question... We'll just get a whole lot opinion and pointless debate.

我認為這在這里不是一個有效的問題，因為它詢問的是我們都無從知曉的動機。更不用說這是一個極具傾向性的問題……我們只會得到一大堆觀點和無意義的爭論。

Ted Wrigley
A good question to ask first would be "Why can't Russia simply let the Eastern Europe stay (at least militarily) neutral between NATO and Russia?" They're certainly not willing to, and it is in NATO's best interest to respond to Russia's actions. Also building anything on members' territory is not "enlargement", so the part about missile defense complex seems irrelevant.

首先要問的一個好問題是“為什么俄羅斯不能讓東歐在北約和俄羅斯之間保持（至少在軍事上）中立呢？” 顯然俄羅斯不愿意這樣，而對俄羅斯的行為做出回應(yīng)符合北約的最大利益。此外，在成員國領(lǐng)土上建造任何東西都不算是“擴張”，所以關(guān)于導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)的部分似乎不相關(guān)。

johnyu
Perhaps we should ask "Why can't Eastern Europe decide for itself whether they want to be in NATO or not, without Russian influence or bullying?"

也許我們應(yīng)該問“為什么東歐不能在不受俄羅斯影響或欺凌的情況下自己決定是否想加入北約呢？”

JJJ?
However, what NATO was doing in the recent years seemed to raise the risk of hot war with Russia. For example, NATO tried to build missile bases in Eastern Europe and even trying to include Ukraine, neighbor of Russia into their organization. What is their motivation of doing so?
The way that paragraph is phrased makes it seem as if NATO is an entity that does things. NATO expands and NATO increases military activity closer to Russia. That's one way of looking at it.
Another way of looking at it is through the scope of those individual nations which make up NATO. That way, NATO countries don't expand further east, but countries which are further east decide for themselves that they want to be part of NATO. That's actually an important principle: self determination.

原文：北約近年來的所作所為似乎增加了與俄羅斯爆發(fā)熱戰(zhàn)的風(fēng)險。例如，北約試圖在東歐建造導(dǎo)彈基地，甚至還試圖將俄羅斯的鄰國烏克蘭納入組織。他們這樣做的動機是什么呢？
回復(fù)——你上述的表述方式讓人感覺北約是一個主動行事的實體。北約在擴張，北約在靠近俄羅斯的地區(qū)增加軍事活動。這是一種看待問題的角度。
另一種看待問題的角度是從組成北約的各個國家的層面出發(fā)。從這個角度看，不是北約國家向東進一步擴張，而是更靠東的國家自行決定想要成為北約的一部分。這實際上是一個重要原則：自決權(quán)。

Non-NATO members Sweden and Finland used this reasoning, according to dw.com:
Recently, the leaders of Sweden and Finland, non-member states aligned with NATO, signaled they see their decision to join NATO as their own right of self-determination in the wake of Russia's troop movements near the Ukraine border.
This isn't new though, from the NATO website:
NATO’s door has been open to new members since it was founded in 1949 – and that has never changed. This “Open Door Policy” is enshrined in Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty, which says “any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic” can apply for membership. Decisions on membership are taken by consensus among all Allies. No treaty signed by the United States, Europe and Russia included provisions on NATO membership.
And more recently NATO's Secretary General said:
On membership and the NATO's open door all Allies are united on the core principle that each and every nation has the right to choose his own path. This is enshrined in a lot of fundamental documents, many different documents, which are the foundation for European security. And, therefore, also Allies totally agree that it is only Ukraine and 30 Allies that can decide when Ukraine is ready to become a NATO member. No one else has anything to say and of course Russia doesn't have a veto on whether Ukraine can become a NATO member. Allies are ready to support Ukraine on this path towards membership, helping to implement reforms, modernise the armed forces to meet NATO standards. And then, at the end of the day, it has to be NATO Allies and Ukraine that decides on membership.

據(jù)德國之聲網(wǎng)站報道，非北約成員國瑞典和芬蘭就運用了這種理由：
最近，與北約結(jié)盟的非成員國瑞典和芬蘭的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人表示，鑒于俄羅斯在烏克蘭邊境附近的軍事調(diào)動，他們認為加入北約是他們自己的自決權(quán)利。
不過這并非新情況，從北約的官方網(wǎng)站可知：
自1949年北約成立以來，北約大門一直向新成員敞開——而且這一點從未改變。這項“門戶開放政策”被載入北約創(chuàng)始條約的第十條，該條規(guī)定“任何其他有能力進一步推進本條約原則并為北大西洋安全做出貢獻的歐洲國家”均可申請加入。關(guān)于成員資格的決定由所有盟國以協(xié)商一致的方式做出。美國、歐洲國家與俄羅斯簽署的任何條約中都沒有包含關(guān)于北約成員資格的條款。
最近，北約秘書長也表示：
關(guān)于成員資格以及北約的門戶開放政策，所有盟國在一個核心原則上達成了一致，即每個國家都有權(quán)選擇自己的發(fā)展道路。這一原則被載入許多基本文件中，眾多不同的文件構(gòu)成了歐洲安全的基礎(chǔ)。因此，盟國也完全認同，只有烏克蘭和北約的30個盟國能夠決定烏克蘭何時準(zhǔn)備好成為北約成員國。其他任何人都無權(quán)置喙，當(dāng)然，俄羅斯也無權(quán)否決烏克蘭是否能成為北約成員國。盟國已準(zhǔn)備好在烏克蘭加入北約的道路上提供支持，幫助其實施改革，對武裝部隊進行現(xiàn)代化改造以達到北約標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。最終，必須由北約盟國和烏克蘭來決定成員資格問題。

In other words, NATO isn't the entity that decides to expand. A third country requests to join and that decision then needs to be agreed by the existing members.
Once a country is a member of its own will, it coordinates with other NATO allies on how to defend its territory. It's not like NATO forces a country to take certain military activity it does not want.
Why can't NATO simply let the Eastern Europe stay (at least militarily) neutral between NATO and Russia? What is the motivation of their expansion in Eastern Europe, irritating Russian, and at the cost of a potential Russia-Ukraine war which could involve NATO themselves?
Because that goes against the principle of self determination upon which NATO is founded. If countries in Eastern Europe want to join NATO, then why should NATO say no? That is directly contrary to NATO's open door policy.
Continuing your line of thought, one might argue that it is in NATO's interest to leave Eastern European countries out. That way they come across as less threatening to Russia. That goes against another principle upon which NATO countries or the West more broadly is built: the liberal international order. All NATO members and candidate members are sovereign nations. That means these countries can decide for themselves and whether joining NATO upsets some third country (Russia) isn't a factor in the decision.

換句話說，不是北約這個實體決定進行擴張。而是某個第三國提出加入申請，然后這一決定需要得到現(xiàn)有成員國的認可。
一旦一個國家出于自身意愿成為北約成員國，它就會與其他北約盟國協(xié)調(diào)如何保衛(wèi)自己的領(lǐng)土。并不是北約強迫一個國家進行他們不愿意的軍事活動。
針對——為什么北約不能讓東歐在北約和俄羅斯之間保持（至少在軍事上）中立呢？他們在東歐擴張，激怒俄羅斯，并且冒著可能引發(fā)一場可能會把北約自身卷入其中的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭的風(fēng)險，這樣做的動機是什么呢？
回復(fù)——因為這違背了北約建立所基于的自決權(quán)原則。如果東歐國家想要加入北約，那么北約為什么要說不呢？這與北約的門戶開放政策直接相悖。
順著你的思路繼續(xù)思考，有人可能會爭辯說，把東歐國家排除在外符合北約的利益。這樣一來，北約對俄羅斯來說就不會顯得那么具有威脅性。但這又違背了北約國家乃至更廣泛的西方所遵循的另一個原則：自由國際秩序。所有北約成員國和候選成員國都是主權(quán)國家。這意味著這些國家可以自行決定，而加入北約是否會讓某個第三國（俄羅斯）感到不滿，并不是做出這一決定時考慮的因素。

My understanding is that due to its overall economic conditions today, Russia, a country much weaker than Soviet unx, does not have enough military power to defeat NATO in a hot war without invoking nuclear weapons (e.g., the military budget of Russian is ~$70 billion, compared with ~$700 billion military budget for U.S), although they might have the motivation to start one. See here for NATO's military budget.
Why would Russia have motivation to start a war with NATO? Without using nuclear weapons they would lose and they risk NATO escalating to nuclear weapons. If Russia started a nuclear war against NATO then they guarantee themselves a nuclear response. So in the first case Russia loses, in the second both sides lose by the principle of mutual assured destruction.
As for your comparison of military budget, it's not really a fair comparison. Most countries in the West have paid military membership while Russia relies in large part on conscxtion. Though the US military is stronger than the Russian military, it's not ten times stronger.

針對——軍費問題
俄羅斯為什么會有動機與北約開戰(zhàn)呢？如果不使用核武器，他們會輸?shù)魬?zhàn)爭，而且還冒著北約將沖突升級到核武器層面的風(fēng)險。如果俄羅斯對北約發(fā)動核戰(zhàn)爭，那么他們必然會招致對方的核反擊。所以，在第一種情況下俄羅斯會失敗，在第二種情況下，根據(jù)相互確保摧毀的原則，雙方都會失敗。
所以你對軍事預(yù)算的比較，這其實并不公平。西方大多數(shù)國家實行的是募兵制，而俄羅斯在很大程度上依賴征兵制。雖然美國軍隊比俄羅斯軍隊更強大，但也并非強上十倍。

Akuzminykh
It surprises me that the highest rated answer does not mention the OSCE or any OSCE document. The Russian position and demands are based on OSCE agreements and the principle of indivisible security. I think, this answer shows the problem in this conflict: The West is ignoring the Russian concerns and is only considering what suits them.

令我驚訝，得票最高的答案沒有提及歐洲安全與合作組織（OSCE）或任何歐安組織的文件。俄羅斯的立場和訴求是基于歐安組織的各項協(xié)議以及不可分割的安全原則。我認為，這個答案揭示了這場沖突中的問題：西方無視俄羅斯的關(guān)切，只考慮對他們自身有利的方面。

JJJ
@akuzminykh I'm not sure what you mean by that. If you think it's important, it might be better to write it up in a new answer. This question is more focused on NATO's perspective, I think. The Russian concerns might be more relevant to a question that asks for Russia's perspective. Maybe this one?

我不太明白你這話是什么意思。如果你覺得這很重要，或許最好寫一個新的答案來闡述。我認為這個問題更側(cè)重于北約的視角。俄羅斯的關(guān)切可能更適合回答一個從俄羅斯視角出發(fā)的問題。也許是這個問題呢？
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Matthew Christopher Bartsh
+1 This answer, it seems to me, albeit probably unintentionally, does a great job at showing the kind of hubris that played a part in causing the invitation of Ukraine into NATO.

在我看來，這個答案，盡管可能并非有意為之，但卻很好地展現(xiàn)了那種在推動邀請烏克蘭加入北約這件事上起到一定作用的傲慢態(tài)度。
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Italian Philosopher
The question with Ukraine is basically down to Ukraine not trusting Russia one bit and trying to join NATO to get under its protective umbrella.
It's like the little kid at school buddying up to you to help out against the school bully. Sure, it might feel good to be protective and a good guy and all that. But you may also get a bloody nose from fighting the bully and the lil guy won't be a big help in a fight. If only it wasn't your problem...
How did this come to be? Well, partially from Bush in 2008 who thought it would be a good idea to promise accession. Why did they do it? Probably not directly to threaten Russia, but the Bush team was always pretty hubristic in seeing everything the American way.

烏克蘭問題歸根結(jié)底在于烏克蘭一點都不信任俄羅斯，試圖加入北約以尋求北約保護傘的庇護。
這就好比學(xué)校里的小孩子找你幫忙對抗校園惡霸。當(dāng)然，能保護他人并成為好人的感覺可能不錯。但你可能會在與惡霸的爭斗中被打得鼻青臉腫，而且那個小家伙在打斗中也幫不上什么大忙。要是這根本就不是你的問題就好了……
事情怎么會變成這樣呢？部分原因在于2008年的小布什，他認為承諾讓烏克蘭加入北約是個好主意。他們?yōu)槭裁催@么做呢？可能并非直接為了威脅俄羅斯，但小布什團隊總是以相當(dāng)傲慢的美國視角看待一切。

Diplomats and analysts say that the transatlantic split is such that today's session will produce a formula that effectively replicates the conflicting signals sent in Bucharest. They add that the Bucharest decision was a mistake that contributed to the Caucasus crisis in August.
The issue of Nato membership for the two countries is intimately lixed with western policy towards Russia, currently incoherent and contradictory. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France earlier this month backed Russian calls for a major summit next year to try to redefine Europe's "security architecture." An international foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki later this week could see Germany, France, Russia, and Finland supporting the summit, which is also opposed by the US and Britain.

外交人士和分析家表示，跨大西洋地區(qū)存在分歧，以至于今天的會議將得出一個方案，實際上是在重復(fù)布加勒斯特會議上傳達出的相互矛盾的信號。他們還補充說，布加勒斯特會議的決定是一個錯誤，導(dǎo)致了8月的高加索危機。
這兩個國家（烏克蘭和格魯吉亞）加入北約的問題與西方對俄羅斯的政策密切相關(guān)，而目前西方的政策既不連貫又相互矛盾。本月早些時候，法國總統(tǒng)尼古拉?薩科齊支持俄羅斯提出的明年舉行一次重大峰會的呼吁，以試圖重新定義歐洲的“安全架構(gòu)”。本周晚些時候在赫爾辛基舉行的一次國際外長會議上，德國、法國、俄羅斯和芬蘭可能會支持這次峰會，而美國和英國則持反對態(tài)度。

Plus ca change...
Since then, no one's really had the guts to walk it back - including the US which probably isn't that happy with the Bush promise - and doing so now would look like rewarding Putin for his aggression.
Given all the contortions NATO is going through in its statements about Ukraine:
Ukraine is free to apply if it wishes
but there are conditions that it has to meet first
and it won't happen in immediate future
and, btw, since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, we don't have to defend it.
The bulk of NATO doesn't want Ukraine aboard right now and would be happy to see the whole embarrassment shelved (yes, places like Poland or the Baltics would love to stick it to Russia, but they are smaller members).

本質(zhì)都是一樣的……
從那以后，實際上沒人有勇氣收回承諾——包括美國，它可能對小布什做出的承諾也不太滿意——而現(xiàn)在收回承諾看起來就像是對普京的挑釁行為的獎勵。
鑒于北約在關(guān)于烏克蘭的聲明中自相矛盾：
烏克蘭如果愿意，可以自由申請加入北約；
但它首先必須滿足一些條件；
而且短期內(nèi)不會實現(xiàn)；
順便說一下，因為烏克蘭不是北約成員國，我們沒有義務(wù)保衛(wèi)它。
北約的大多數(shù)成員國目前并不希望烏克蘭加入，并且很樂意看到整個令人尷尬的局面被擱置（是的，像波蘭或波羅的海國家這樣的地方很想給俄羅斯點顏色看看，但它們是北約的小成員國）。

Here are some pros and cons of accession now, articulated by some heavy hitters in international relations (not just this week's assigned Ukraine "expert" by papers needing to cover the news). Note from it that, since accession needs unanimity from existing members, Ukraine has effectively no chance under current circumstances.
The lack of enthusiasm of NATO towards Ukraine accession or the, supposed, lack of aggressive intent by NATO does not mean that Russia doesn't have security concerns about NATO's proximity. Look at the US and its serial hissy fits with regards to Cuba or its formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. Russia, like other states, is in its right to be cautious about inimical influences near its borders. Unlike most states, it is extremely capable to push back against real or perceived threats. Expecting it to "put up with it" is wishful thinking.

以下是一些國際關(guān)系中的重量級人物（不只是本周那些為報道新聞而被指定的烏克蘭“專家”）闡述的現(xiàn)在讓烏克蘭加入北約的一些利弊。請注意，由于加入北約需要現(xiàn)有成員國的一致同意，在目前的情況下，烏克蘭實際上沒有機會加入。
北約對烏克蘭加入缺乏熱情，或者說北約所謂的沒有侵略意圖，并不意味著俄羅斯對北約的逼近沒有安全方面的擔(dān)憂?？纯疵绹鼘虐鸵贿B串的憤怒反應(yīng)，以及它制定的門羅主義。和其他國家一樣，俄羅斯有權(quán)對其邊境附近的敵對勢力保持謹慎。與大多數(shù)國家不同的是，它有極強的能力反擊真實的或被認為存在的威脅。指望它“忍受”這種情況只是一廂情愿的想法。
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But if it was an easier neighbor to live with, as Russia, and as its predecessor state, USSR, then neighboring countries would be more willing to stick to neutrality.
Ukraine crisis is not the same thing as the Polish ABM base, which is one domain where Russia has more reasonable reasons for concerns (although it has hard to see what its 10 ABMs would do to deter Russian forces, rather than Iran's).
Russia did this to itself, starting with the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. That annexation of Crimea? Came months after Ukraine's ousting of their corrupt leader, Yanukovich, a protege of Putin's who went straight to Moscow. Just a coincidence.
Few neighboring countries that are not totalitarian themselves trust Putin's Russia. That's why those countries want to join NATO.

但如果俄羅斯，以及它的前身蘇聯(lián)，是一個更容易相處的鄰國，那么周邊國家會更愿意保持中立。
烏克蘭危機與波蘭的反導(dǎo)基地問題不同，在反導(dǎo)基地問題上，俄羅斯有更合理的理由表示擔(dān)憂（盡管很難看出波蘭的10個反導(dǎo)系統(tǒng)除了威懾伊朗的力量之外，對威懾俄羅斯軍隊能起到什么作用）。
俄羅斯這是自作自受，從2008年入侵格魯吉亞和2014年吞并克里米亞就開始了。說到吞并克里米亞？那是在烏克蘭驅(qū)逐其腐敗領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人亞努科維奇幾個月之后發(fā)生的，亞努科維奇是普京的親信，被驅(qū)逐后直接去了莫斯科。這只是個巧合罷了。
在那些自身不是極權(quán)主義的鄰國中，幾乎沒有哪個信任普京領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的俄羅斯。這就是那些國家想加入北約的原因。

It is telling that amidst this brouhaha Finland, which has decades of careful real neutrality under its belt, is vaguely considering joining NATO. That's just odd. Sweden was mentioned by JJJ, but Finland seems much more fundamentally neutral than them. Again, Finland's hitherto distant collaboration with NATO warmed up after 2014 - see a pattern?
Is it NATO's wider interest to include members that have immediate borders with Russia? No, not really, unless they plan to invade Russia which our electorates would never agree to. By having direct borders with Russia NATO risks border incidents that could easily escalate. It really isn't worth the hassle and the prospective members bring negligible force projection capabilities, outside of their own territory at least.

值得注意的是，在這場喧囂中，幾十年來一直小心翼翼保持真正中立的芬蘭，也在隱約考慮加入北約。這太奇怪了。JJJ提到了瑞典，但芬蘭在本質(zhì)上似乎比瑞典更加中立。同樣，芬蘭與北約此前較為疏遠的合作關(guān)系在2014年后升溫了——看出規(guī)律了嗎？
讓與俄羅斯直接接壤的國家加入北約符合北約更廣泛的利益嗎？不，并不是這樣，除非北約計劃入侵俄羅斯，而這是北約國家的選民永遠不會同意的。與俄羅斯直接接壤，北約面臨著邊境事件的風(fēng)險，而這些事件很容易升級。這實在不值得去折騰，而且這些潛在的成員國除了在本國領(lǐng)土范圍內(nèi)，至少在投射軍事力量方面幾乎沒有什么作用。

It would be great to have a neutral Ukraine, with its security guaranteed by NATO and Russia and call it a day.
Why, it could even look like this agreement, which Russia signed in 1994 to get Ukraine's share of Soviet nukes:
The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind;

要是有一個中立的烏克蘭，它的安全由北約和俄羅斯共同保障，那該多好，這樣事情也就解決了。
為什么這么說呢？因為可以參照俄羅斯在1994年簽署的這份協(xié)議，當(dāng)時是為了讓烏克蘭放棄其擁有的蘇聯(lián)核武器：
俄羅斯聯(lián)邦、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯(lián)合王國和美利堅合眾國重申，有義務(wù)不對烏克蘭的領(lǐng)土完整或政治獨立進行威脅或使用武力，并且除非出于自衛(wèi)或根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國憲章》的其他規(guī)定，它們的任何武器永遠不會對烏克蘭使用；
俄羅斯聯(lián)邦、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯(lián)合王國和美利堅合眾國根據(jù)歐洲安全與合作會議最后文件的原則，重申對烏克蘭的承諾，不進行旨在使烏克蘭行使其主權(quán)所固有的權(quán)利屈從于自身利益的經(jīng)濟脅迫，從而獲取任何形式的利益；

Now, can Ukraine believe it would solve its problem, this time? This is the problem with breaking agreements, no one believes you later.
For the record, I think it is wrong to accept Ukraine in NATO, now or later. It would be an aggressive move by NATO. However that leaves the question what exactly would provide assurances to Ukraine that they can continue to be an independent state at this point, free of military, economic or political intimidation by either the West or Russia. And free to manage their political and economic alliances as they choose.

那么現(xiàn)在，這次烏克蘭能相信這份協(xié)議會解決它的問題嗎？這就是違背協(xié)議的后果，之后就沒人會相信你了。
鄭重聲明，我認為無論是現(xiàn)在還是以后讓烏克蘭加入北約都是錯誤的。這將是北約的一種侵略行為。然而，這就留下了一個問題：究竟要怎樣才能讓烏克蘭相信，在目前的情況下，它能夠繼續(xù)作為一個獨立的國家存在，免受西方或俄羅斯在軍事、經(jīng)濟或政治上的恐嚇，并且能夠自由地按照自己的選擇管理其政治和經(jīng)濟聯(lián)盟呢。

@user24711 the exact wording doesn't change my answer all that much. NATO's senior members have limited interest in expansion. –
Italian Philosopher

你這些更具體的措辭并沒有在很大程度上改變我的答案。北約的主要成員國對擴張的興趣有限?！?意大利哲學(xué)家
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://m.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處

I'm not sure why you set that lix under word "easier neighbor". I'm pretty NATO wars list is way longer. –
Oleg V. Volkov

我不確定你為什么在“更容易相處的鄰國”這個詞下面設(shè)置那個鏈接。我很確定北約參與戰(zhàn)爭的清單要長得多。

Didn't Russia already sign a treaty saying they guaranteed Ukraine's security? The fact that they're very clearly disregarding the prior treaty they signed on the subject raises questions about what the value of a new one would be. –
Charles Duffy

俄羅斯不是已經(jīng)簽署了一項條約，承諾保障烏克蘭的安全嗎？他們顯然無視了之前在這個問題上簽署的條約，這就讓人對新條約的價值產(chǎn)生了疑問。

@CharlesDuffy yes, they did. That's the wording I was quoting, from Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed in 1994. Which is why the option of a negotiated understanding between Ukraine and Russia is somewhat off the table. All parties can have a general understanding that Russia lays off + gets something in return OR attacks and gets sanctioned. That's a good way to make business together. But Ukraine is unlikely to re-trust them based on a treaty. That ship has sailed. –
Italian Philosopher

是的，他們簽過。我引用的正是1994年簽署的《布達佩斯安全保障備忘錄》里的措辭。這就是為什么烏克蘭和俄羅斯之間通過談判達成諒解的這個選項在某種程度上已經(jīng)不可行了。各方可以達成一個大致的共識，即俄羅斯停止行動并得到一些回報，或者發(fā)動攻擊然后遭到制裁。這是一種雙方合作的好方式。但烏克蘭不太可能基于一項條約再次信任他們。信任的機會已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了。

I suggest removing Iran bit in () about Polish ABM base, or briefly explain how would a Polish base actually matters for Iran. Looking at a map (rather, globe) has me completely puzzled as Poland doesn't seem useful against hypothetical Iranian missiles. It isn't in the line for most countries and for those few that is, missiles would be already descending so ABM wouldn't work as well. –
Zizy Archer

我建議刪除關(guān)于波蘭反導(dǎo)基地那段話中括號里提到伊朗的部分，或者簡要解釋一下波蘭的基地實際上對伊朗有什么意義?？匆幌碌貓D（確切地說是地球儀），我完全不明白，因為波蘭似乎對假想中的伊朗導(dǎo)彈沒什么作用。對于大多數(shù)國家來說，波蘭不在導(dǎo)彈飛行的路線上，而對于少數(shù)在路線上的國家來說，導(dǎo)彈已經(jīng)處于下降階段了，所以反導(dǎo)系統(tǒng)也起不了太大作用。
（已經(jīng)被刪了）